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Abstract
Taking as a case study the documentary Unknown White Male (UK,
2005) — a film whose theme and receptions problematizes stable notions
of what constitutes subjectivity — a corrective is o¤ered to the dominant
mode applying Peircean semiotics to the moving image. Cinema and media
studies have tended to apply Peirce’s triadic division of the sign in a limited,
formalist mode following the explications of his method o¤ered by Wollen
and others. However Wollen ignores Peirce’s placement of photograph as
indexical within the context of the iconic as well as the distinction Peirce
draws between ‘instantaneous’ and ‘composite’ photographs. Moreover,
Perice’s more general understanding of the importance of semiotic analysis
to the overall mental well-being of the human subject, hitherto largely
ignored by media scholars, is also addressed.
Keywords: semiotics; semiology; indexicality; iconicity; documentary;
Wollen.
We live in two worlds, a world of fact and a
world of fancy. Each of us is accustomed to
think that he is the creator of his world of
fancy; that he has but to pronounce his fiat,
and the thing exists, with no resistance and
no e¤ort . . . But man is sly, and contrives to
make this little more than he needs. Beyond
that, he defends himself from the angles of
hard fact by clothing himself with a garment
of contentment and of habituation.
—CP 1.321
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1. The documentary as evidence
On the ‘blotter’ at a Coney Island police station, on the morning of July
3, 2003, the o‰cers entered the man who presented himself, claiming to
be totally unaware of his identity, as an ‘Unknown White Male.’ And
this is the title, Unknown White Male, taken by British documentary film-
maker Rupert Murray for his UK documentary on the case, released the-
atrically to some measure of controversy in 2006.1
For no clear medical reason and with no prior history of any psycho-
logical problems, the man, Doug Bruce, 35, had wandered away during
the night from his Manhattan apartment only to find himself the follow-
ing morning lost on Coney Island. He was carrying an almost empty
rucksack and was expensively, if very casually, dressed. Within the ruck-
sack was a slip of paper with a telephone number that turned out to be
that of a recent ex-girlfriend’s mother. Bruce’s ‘ordeal’ was at the level
of actually establishing who he was — a wealthy, privately educated,
English-born, yuppie merchant banker who had become a photographer
— therefore quite minor. However, at a psychological level, it was a dev-
astating development, not just for Bruce but also for his wide circle of
British and American family, lovers, and friends. These included the film-
maker Murray who had known him for fifteen years. Moreover, as a priv-
ileged white male, Bruce’s condition was treated, as far as the film repre-
sents this, as genuine and he was soon in the hands of the Coney Island
Hospital neurologists. Indeed, within psychology, the authenticity of
Bruce’s case has apparently been little questioned. For example, a review
of the film in the British Medical Journal by Piyal Sen, a working forensic
psychiatrist, treats Bruce as an unproblematic case study of rare total psy-
chogenic amnesia with ‘no obvious precipitant,’ although, Sen noted, he
is discovered to have a minor pituitary tumor. For the non-specialist
viewer, the film skirts the condition as a cause of Bruce’s problem and its
removal does nothing for his condition; but Sen sees Unknown White
Male through this attenuated medical frame and nowhere questions the
veracity either of Bruce’s amnesia or the film’s account of it. Sen con-
cludes by suggesting that the documentary ‘reminds us of the educational
power of individual case reports in rare conditions. A psychiatrist named
Freud would have been pleased’ (Sen 2006).
In documentary circles, though, the film has fared less well. Critics on
both sides of the Atlantic have pinpointed a variety of issues questioning
the truthfulness of Bruce’s claims and criticized Murray’s presentation of
them. ‘The film raises some fascinating philosophical stumpers about
identity and love,’ thought The Washington Post, ‘but there’s one ques-
tion you won’t hear in the voice-over: is this film about a big brazen
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lie?.’2 The New York Times stated: ‘It’s a puzzle why Mr. Murray doesn’t
include at least one doctor who has treated his friend expressly for his af-
fliction (maybe he forgot).’ This Times reviewer, Manuela Dargis, on the
other hand does not forget to mention that a Finnish fiction film, Aki
Kaurismaki’s Man Without a Past, about a total amnesiac, opened in
New York two months before Bruce’s amnesia manifested itself.3 Even
without this prompt, if prompt it be, it is entirely possible that Bruce
could be engaged, in his newfound vocation as a creative person, in a spe-
cies of performance art.
For these reviewers and, indeed, any viewer predisposed to read it in
this way, the film becomes not a documentary about a rare mental condi-
tion so much as an intriguing puzzle as to, for example, the number of
the people filmed who were (and are) in the ‘know.’ The first girlfriend,
for sure, looks a bit self-conscious; but not her mother. Nor do Bruce’s
family look other than genuinely confused and disturbed, especially his
widowed father. And Bruce himself, without question, gives a compelling
performance, again if performance it be. Are they (or some of them) ‘fak-
ing’? We’ll never have the answer to that from the screen alone. This doc-
umentary, despite its implicit evidentiary claims and the richness of the
photographic data it deploys, as usual tells us far less than we might
want to know. That Bruce clearly has the material resources to stage an
elaborate ‘stunt’ of this kind and that the film reveals him as being quite
unthinking and uncaring, certainly enough not to worry if he distressed
people in the name of art, is but a clue, an indicator of the reality which
might lay behind the movie.
And Murray, the filmmaker? Dupe or conspirator? The point is that it
really does not matter.
Murray, though, has, to a certain extent, played into the hands of the
doubting Thomases by deploying an aesthetic that owes far more to cine-
ma’s avant-garde than it does to the dominant mode of Anglophone doc-
umentary. Although there is one scene with a doctor in which reference is
made to repeated scans and other medical procedures, Murray clearly is
not interested in the physical manifestations of the condition insofar as it
existed. This leads critics such as Dargis to suggest that Murray ‘would
have done well to mix more documentaries in with his art-house fare’ be-
cause there has been for a forty and more year period during which doc-
umentary — defined in 1933 by John Grierson, as the ‘creative treatment
of actuality’ (Paget 1998: 117) — has been dominated by a rigorous ob-
servational style that Murray eschews but critics such as Dargis expect
(Winston 2000: 17–23). This style, ‘direct cinema’ or ‘truthmovies’ as a
cynic once named them (Winston 1995: 203), using hand-held camera
and available light and sound is colloquially and significantly called
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‘fly on the wall’ filming. Adopting this as its dominant mode has meant
that for decades mainstream (that is television) Anglophone documentary
has popularly come to mean not the personal, the impressionistic or
the poetic — all once available to the film documentarist as legiti-
mate approaches — but rather only the observational and the non-
interventionist. It has owed far more to the aesthetic of broadcast
television news than to these alternatives. This overemphasis on the ob-
servational has had the e¤ect of de-problematizing the question of the evi-
dentiary value of the film image, its ‘truthfulness,’ since the cultural force
of such images (especially in their direct cinema purest, minimally inter-
ventionist, mode) has been that they overwhelmingly represent a reality
independent of the filmmaking process — a truth, indeed the truth. It is
because of this culturally powerful aesthetic that Bill Nichols has sug-
gested that documentary, unlike fiction, gives us representations on the
screen whereby ‘instead of a world we are o¤ered access to the world’
(Nichols 1991: 109). It is why Dargis thinks the film is not a ‘documen-
tary’ but ‘art-house’ as if it could not easily be, historically speaking,
both.
It is possible to take issue with Dargis’s position for all that it might
accurately represent how documentary is generally received. Like all film
forms, documentary is always processed and subjected to production con-
straints, especially at editing stage, and is more limited as evidence than
the rhetoric of direct cinema and the ideological thrust of TV news sug-
gests. Although the pre-World War II documentary pioneers traded on
the spurious noneteenth century perception, then almost entirely unques-
tioned, that ‘the camera cannot lie,’ they did at the same time attempt to
claim creative rights. So does Murray, the product of an art-school back-
ground. He deploys the repertoire of the New York experimental film
makers of the mid-1950s and 1960s (e.g., the imagistic collages and dis-
tortions of, say, Stan Brakhage’s Window, Water, Baby, Moving [1959]
or Jonas Mekas in Diaries, Notes, and Sketches [1964–1969]) (Adams Sit-
ney 1979: 150–160, 360–363) as well as the obsessional focus on the film-
maker’s friends and relations that characterized the Boston documentary
school of the 1970s from Je¤ Kreines’s The Plaint of Steve Krienes as Re-
corded by his Younger Brother Je¤ (1974) through the Oscar-winning Best
Boy (Ira Whol, 1979) to Ross McElwee’s Sherman March (1986) and be-
yond. It is also the case that the recovery of non- (or less) observational
forms in general has been a feature of documentary since the 1980s; but
such work (from, for example, Errol Morris’s Thin Blue Line [1988] and
Michael Moore’s Roger and Me [1989] on) has scarcely dented direct cin-
ema’s hold over the documentary (Winston 1995: 255). For the critics
(and seemingly the public) documentary, despite a recent minor resur-
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gence in the cinemas remains primarily a television — and a journalistic
— form.4
Notwithstanding this common mode of reception, then, Murray’s film
is nevertheless quite acceptable as a documentary in terms of what the
genre was thought to be prior to the arrival of direct cinema. More than
that: Unknown White Male is a telling example of just how di¤erent doc-
umentary can quite legitimately be from the televisual direct cinema
norm. Murray seeks, successfully, to illuminate Bruce’s condition at a
deeper level than merely filming an observed surface — encounters with
medics etc. In consequence of his decision to deploy a di¤erent aesthetic,
what is gained is that Unknown White Male directly raises issues that the
journalistic documentary tradition would be pressed to articulate. The
most important of these, and one that is untouched by the questions of
authenticity arising from the essentially journalistic critique of the film, is
that of a fundamental general question: What is being represented by the
representation on the screen? And, more specifically, what ‘self ’ is being
represented by the self on the screen?
2. Another fine Metz you’ve got me into, Ollie5
The serious post-World War II academic study of film, especially in the
U.S., has been often subject to a certain faddism in its choice of preferred
methodologies. While the research into the history of the cinema has been
thoroughly professionalised over the last half century, moving — for
example — from anecdotage to the thorough examination of studio paper
archives, there have also been a succession of importations of theory
paradigms — from semiology and structuralism to post-Lacanian psy-
chology (and for media studies in general, sociology and political science)
— which have been, in e¤ect, less rigorous. Although these latter have
been quite clearly of great value given the complexity of film and media
practice, they have also, as often as not, rapidly tended towards simplifi-
cation. Bodies of complex work have been not untypically reduced to
easy citations from secondary sources and the original works seldom con-
sulted, much less contextualised.
Of none of current ‘super-theories’ has this been truer than of semiotics
taken from, essentially, Peirce and de Saussure and transported into the
field of, first, cinema studies. The Saussurian bridge was Christian Metz’s
classic work Essais sur la Signification au Cine`ma published in 1968, the
year of French upheavals. Given the Francophone/Anglophone chasm,
it was translated moderately rapidly, the English version, Film Language:
A Semiotics of the Cinema, being available by 1974 (Metz 1974). But
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semiology was already in play on the other side of the channel. In the
year that saw the original appearance of Metz’s collected essays in
French, in the very month of May 1968, in London, Peter Wollen was
writing Signs and Meaning in the Cinema suggesting ‘a number of avenues
by which the outstanding problems of film aesthetics might be fruitfully
approached’ (Wollen 1998 [1969]: 1). Chapter Three is entitled, ‘The
semiology of the cinema’ and focuses (contradictorily) on Peirce.
Metz furnished Anglophone film scholars with an entire pre-digested
library of continental European linguistic theory introducing, among
others Hjelmslev, Greimas, and Barthes’s work on ecriture. De Saussure
figured as an major influence in that, just as Saussurian linguistics leads
to a broader consideration of sign-systems, so for Metz a quasi-linguistic
consideration of film leads to a second non-verbal analysis — a ‘second
articulation’ — of the fundamental ‘image discourse’ of the cinema
(Metz 1974: 60). Metz applied the French recovery of cinema theory,
which had been articulated by the Russian formalists in the 1920s. Trans-
lations of their work into French were appearing as he was writing and
the very term ‘cine` langue’ comes from the Russians and dates from 1924
(Metz 1974: 256, note 21). The debates about the nature of the cinema
swirling about Mayakovsky’s Lef review in Moscow four decades earlier
were of a sophistication that had been unmatched in the intervening pe-
riod. Now this scholarship and polemic acquired an influence in the
West in the 1970s through Metz’s intervention.6 For the first time, film
scholarship was given a theoretical ‘tool box’ whose complexity matched
the object of study — the screen. This applied not only at the micro-level
of image analysis and signification practice but also addressed questions
of narrative at a macro level (Genette 1966).7 The price of the tools pro-
vided by these continental European thinkers was that, when used in
Metzian mode by many Anglophone film and media scholars, they
tended to become rather blunt. For example, there remained for Metz
himself a question as to the applicability of these concepts to the cinema:
‘it is di‰cult to avoid shuttling back and forth between two positions: the
cinema as a language; the cinema as infinitely di¤erent from verbal lan-
guage’ (Metz 1974: 44); but no such hesitancies blocked many of those
who followed him.
For Wollen, also not entirely convinced by the Saussurian linguistic
analogy (Wollen 1998 [1969]: 166), Metz himself and some of those he
relied on were to a certain extent deficient and he sought to correct some
problems with the help of an Anglo-Saxon champion who could provide
‘a more precise discussion of what we mean by a ‘‘natural sign’’ and
by the series of words such as ‘‘analogous,’’ ‘‘continuous,’’ ‘‘motivated,’’
which are used to describe such signs, by Barthes, Metz, and others.’
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‘Fortunately,’ Wollen wrote, ‘the groundwork necessary for further preci-
sion has already been accomplished by Charles Peirce’ (Wollen 1998
[1969]: 82).
Wollen saw in Peirce’s work on the nature of the relationship between
sign and object a more viable paradigm for cinema studies; but by high-
lighting the American logician’s triadic division of iconic, indexical, and
symbolic signs, the Peirce he brought into play was a rather limited and
formalist thinker. However, Wollen made it clear, in ways that those
who followed him often did not, that the triadic taxonomy did not pre-
sent discrete alternatives but, in any given sign, elements of the three dif-
ferent relationships or connectivities could overlap. Indeed, such mixing
was for Peirce and for Wollen the mark of the ‘perfect sign.’ Wollen, per-
haps somewhat optimistically, concluded Signs and Meanings by claiming
this blending is what the contemporary Godard (and his own future work
on Penthesilia [1974] with Laura Mulvey) was delivering or attempting to
deliver on the screen.
The di‰culty was that in his Peircean turn Wollen made no attempt
to problematize Peirce’s own nineteenth century understanding of the
photograph: nor indeed to attempt to utilize Peirce’s subsequent devel-
oped taxonomy, which went well beyond the comparatively straightfor-
ward triadic division that he popularised in Anglophone cinema studies
circles.8 This initial system Peirce had outlined in apparently unambi-
guous terms:
Photographs, especially instantaneous photographs, are very instructive, because
we know that in certain respects they are exactly like the objects they represent.
But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such
circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to na-
ture. In that aspect, then, they belong to the second class of signs, those by physi-
cal connection. (CP 2: 281)
Of ‘that aspect,’ he writes that a photograph is ‘virtually a section of
rays projected from an object otherwise known’ (CP 2.320); or of the pho-
tograph’s ‘optical connection with the object’ (CP 4.447).
Here is a view of the writer’s house; what makes that house to be the object of the
view? Surely not the similarity of appearance. There are ten thousand others in
country just like it. No, but the photographer sets up the film in such a way that
according to the laws of optics, the film was forced to receive an image of this
house. What the sign virtually has to do in order to indicate its object — and
make it its — all it has to do is just to seize its interpreter’s eyes and forcibly turn
them upon the object meant . . . It is pure physiological compulsion; nothing else.
(CP 5.554)
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However, despite the dismissal of ‘similarity of appearance,’ Peirce else-
where acknowledges (but Wollen does not clearly note) that the photo-
graph does indeed ‘resemble’ the thing photographed — and that ‘resem-
blance’ in the Peircean system is the mark of iconicity. On balance,
though, Wollen and cinema studies cannot be held responsible for the
problems with this reading of Peirce. He was himself less clear as to the
indexicality of photographic image than film scholarship, following Wol-
len, has suggested. Peirce insisted that the di¤erence is that an icon exhib-
its ‘the features of a state of things regarded as if it were purely imagi-
nary’ whereas the value of an index is that ‘it assures us of positive fact’
— but this is simply a naı¨ve view (CP 4.448). Au fond, the trouble is that
physical connection, physiological compulsion, is an inadequate descrip-
tor of photographic reality for a number of reasons.
First, Peirce’s other examples of the indexical physical connection be-
tween sign and object seem somewhat at odds with the high density of
photographic data. He writes: ‘I see a man with rolling gait. This is a
probably an indication that he is a sailor . . . A sundial or clock indicates
the time of day’ (CP 2.285). Such connectivities, drained of specificity,
while certainly ‘forced,’ seem to be of a di¤erent order to the data-rich
specificities of the photograph.
But, second, there is the question of manipulation. Peirce was confused
by the dominant technicist hyperbole of his day, specifically the arrival
for the first time of a photographic process for the masses. Kodak cam-
eras had been introduced in 1888 and the ‘instantaneous’ was very much
in the air when he was writing. The advertising slogan that made the
company a world brand for over a century — ‘You Press the Button and
We Do the Rest’ — obviously impressed him. In the fashion of the time,
in his writing ‘Kodak’ becomes ‘kodak,’ a certain sort of instantaneous
un-manipulated image: ‘For example, if I and all the company are so ex-
cited that we think we see a ghost, I can try what an unimaginative kodak
would say to it’ (CP 2.142). The ‘unimaginative’ camera with its vision of
photography as a purely mechanized process dates back to the very first
days of its development: to Franc¸ois Arago’s 1839 argument in the
Chambre des De`pute`s as to why the French state ought to acquire
Daguerre’s patents. The photographic camera, he claimed, was nothing
but a sort of ‘thermometer, barometer, hygrometer’ and ought therefore
to be as freely available (Eder 1972: 238–239). Clearly Peirce’s camera
failing to capture an image of the ghost is nothing but an Aragonian
thermometer — unimaginatively — at work; and Peirce, true to the then
dominant rhetoric that the camera could not lie, seems to buy into this.
At one level, obviously when not tackling the supernatural, the camera is
very successful at being ‘forced’ to record what is before it but Peirce
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tends simply to ignore the fact that image manipulation is a dominant
characteristic of the photographic process at every stage, especially in
the dark room. A simple concept of ‘forcing’ does not explain it. You
might press the button but Eastman Kodak (or — better — any non-
industrialized amateur using equipment more sophisticated than a Box
Brownie) could do a great deal when they did ‘the rest.’
The photograph can be physically ‘forced’ through framing, develop-
ment, and printing, etc., not to correspond point by point to nature. This
is clearly the case with, for example, wide-angle lenses, filters, black and
white, the specific limited modes of color film representations, cropping,
and so on; but it also exists within more culturally transparent practices
— the standard lens, the ‘kodak’ snap-shot, the chemists’ automated
print. The laws of optics can be easily subverted and the interpreter is
not such a pushover as to be entirely in their grip. She is an autonomous
agent able to control the process, if so desired, and break the connectivity
in significant ways. That is why the photographer can be an ‘artist’ like
any other.
Peircean scholars are aware of the limitations of photographic indexi-
cality. For example, Go¨ran Sonesson asserts: ‘First and foremost, the
photograph is an iconic sign’ (Sonesson 1999: 81) and that ‘The trouble
with a purely indexicalist account of photography is that it cannot explain
what the photograph is a picture of ’’ (Sonesson 1999: 3):
In the case of a photograph, on the other hand, we do not need to conceive of it
indexically to be able to grasp its meaning. It will continue to convey its significa-
tions to us, whether we are certain that it is a photograph or not. Indexicality, in
photo-graphs [sic], really is a question of second thoughts and peculiar circum-
stances. (Sonesson 1999: 81)
In the peculiar Peircean circumstances of cinema studies, such second
thoughts seldom occurred even though the point is conceded by Peirce
himself: ‘The mere [photographic] print does not, in itself, convey infor-
mation; it is a ‘‘quasi-subject’’ of the object photographed’ (CP 2.320).
An indexical significant, it ‘asserts nothing; it only says ‘‘There!’’ It takes
hold of our eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs them to a particular ob-
ject, and it stops’ (CP 3.361). ‘A pure icon also can convey no positive or
factual information: for it a¤ords no assurance that there is any such
thing in nature’ (CP 4.447).
But it must be said, in the third place, that it is not the case that Peirce
is unaware of nineteenth century photographic processes in general. In-
deed, initially he seemed to class the photograph as an image resembling
the original, an icon in his emerging system: ‘In portraiture, photographs
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mediate between the original and the likeness’ (CP 1: 367). This would
make them, in his view, iconic and even as he conversely classes photo-
graphs as ‘indexical’ because of the (spurious, or rather, limited) concept
of ‘forcing,’ he acknowledges the photograph as being ‘in certain respects
. . . exactly like the objects they represent’ (CP 2: 281). One solution to
this contradiction was then to talk of two distinct classes of photographs
— the instantaneous and composite. This distinction, ignored by Wollen,
which Peirce draws between ‘instantaneous photographs’ and other ‘com-
posite photographs,’ suggests that he was not oblivious to the potential of
photographic manipulation.
Compositing had become the mark of the art photograph. Much was
made of the fact that a photographer such as Henry Peach Robinson
could produce an a¤ecting image of now risible Victorian sentimentality
in his 1858 print of a dying young woman surrounded by her family, Fad-
ing Away, out of no less than five negatives — clouds, foreground figures,
background, and so on (Winston 2005: 168). Galton composited for sup-
posedly scientific purposes, for example, to create a general physiognomy
of the criminal from the portraits of individual criminals: ‘one that repre-
sents no man in particular, but portrays an imaginary figure, possessing
the average features of any given group of men’ (Galton 1878: 97). The
combinations necessary to produce such composites as are designated by
Peirce ‘icons’ — where the image is ‘similar’ to or ‘like’ the object repre-
sented are not indexes: ‘in the same way that any image is a ‘‘composite
photograph’’ of innumerable particulars.’ Not only that: ‘Even what is
called an ‘‘instantaneous photograph’’ taken with a camera, is a compos-
ite of the e¤ects of intervals of exposure more numerous by far than the
sands of the sea’ (CP 2.441).
The connectivity with a high level of ‘likeness’ does indeed suggest the
photograph as icon and by the early 1890s he was definitely using the
popular amateur photograph to describe the icons exactly because they
are not ‘forced’ to be indexical. The popularity of the ‘snapshot’ and its
availability for the first time to a mass of people unpracticed in photogra-
phy can be thought of as a significant, albeit distorting, influence on using
photography as one illustration of the triadic division he was elaborating.
This is not to say that simply reclassifying the photograph as iconic rather
than indexical corrects a taxonomic error. A pure icon, Peirce suggested
‘does not draw any distinction between itself and its object,’ again a preg-
nant but somewhat problematic assertion.9 But the case can be made that
references in his writing to ‘resemblance’ in photographs and to the status
of the composite photographic image, although still di‰cult to map onto
photographic realities, clearly expands the photographic beyond the
indexical.
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Of course, as Wollen makes clear, such vexed oppositions between sign
types have no place in Peirce where all three, including the symbolic,
contribute to making the perfect sign. Peirce himself actually describes a
photograph as ‘an index having an icon incorporated in it’ (CP 4.447).
He essentially explains iconicity in general in terms of indexicality. The
seemingly straightforward statement that photographs are indexical and
‘. . . belong to the second class of signs, those by physical connection’
actually comes in the section explaining icons (EP 2: 5). Elsewhere he ex-
plicates the confusion thus:
As the index may be complex, so also may the icon. For instance . . . we may have
an icon which is composed alternatively of two, a sort of composite of two icons,
in the same way that any image is a ‘composite photograph’ of innumerable par-
ticulars. Even what is called an ‘instantaneous photograph,’ taken with a camera,
is a composite of the e¤ects of intervals of exposure more numerous by far than
the sands of the sea. Take an absolute instant during the exposure and the com-
posite represents this among other conditions. Now, the two alternative icons are
combined like that. We have an icon of this alternation, a composite of all the al-
ternative cases we have thought of . . . Two signs so conjoined are said to be ag-
gregated, or disjunctively connected, or alternatively conjoined. (CP 2.441)
This mixing of icon and index clearly demonstrates that this element of
his thought requires a more nuanced reading than is usually accorded it
through the Wollenian prism. As Peirce wrote:
It is impossible to find a proposition so simple as not to have reference to two
signs. Take, for instance, ‘it rains.’ Here the icon is the mental composite photo-
graph of all the rainy days the thinker has experienced. The index is all whereby
he distinguishes that day, as it is placed in his experience. The symbol is the men-
tal act whereby [he] stamps that day as rainy . . . (CP 2.441)
But this is to take us beyond the image as index or icon.
3. ‘All reasoning is an interpretation of signs’
In Unknown White Male Murray reconstructs Bruce’s nocturnal journey
by subway to Coney Island using an extreme wide-angle lens to film the
carriage from Bruce’s point of view and at the same time to include undis-
torted shots of Bruce himself in the clothes (presumably) he was then wear-
ing and other shots of views from the car. The indexical ‘forcing’ involved
in these distorted images is arguably attenuated because in the nature of
the case they immediately call into question the nature of the ‘natural
sign.’ For all that culturally determined conventions are built into the
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photographic apparatus some are seen as more transparently representing
human perception as it is experienced (as far as we can know this of others)
by healthy eye-brain systems in the living subject. The distorted shots of
the subway car and the street in Coney Island are not ‘natural signs’ in
that they do not do this. Convention suggests that these images should be
read as much as a reflection of Bruce’s inner mental state as ‘forced’ im-
ages of the carriage itself. Such a convention, struggling as it does against
the dominant use of photography as a source of realist (or as it might be)
‘natural’ signs, is not well established. We do not know, nor are we actu-
ally expected to believe, that this distortion is really what Bruce saw.
Moreover, the indexicality of the image is further undercut because, al-
though not overtly identified as such, the sequence is a reconstruction.
Obviously it was not taken on the night of July 3, 2003 when Bruce wan-
dered o¤ to Coney Island. Despite the stringency of the ‘rules’ governing
the use of reconstruction in non-fiction output laid down in the produc-
tion codes of various UK broadcasters, Murray omitted to mark the se-
quence as a reconstruction, but such omissions are common place. Mur-
ray, working on a Channel 4 commission, would be subject to them, but
where the reconstruction is self-evident the audience is deemed to under-
stand and no overt identification is needed. In this case, the distorted im-
age of the interior of the subway car does not reflect the actual train
Bruce took (unless by accident). It is merely of the same general type. In-
deed, there is an exterior shot of a subway train that we see before we see
Bruce on board and film-editing convention suggests this must be the one
he took. But it is a ‘B’ train (according to the symbolic illuminated sign it
displays), which does not even go to Coney Island.10 Bruce’s trip to Co-
ney Island, at this level, no more ‘forces’ the reconstructed image of him
making the journey than does the ‘normal’ perception of the carriage
‘force’ its image through the distorting wide-angle lens.
This documentary, and indeed all non-fiction imaging, can be subjected
to the same level of critique. At one level, such exercises are pointless as
they merely serve to reinforce the unrealistic realist expectation that the
image is evidence by pointing up how this hope is not being met. This
has the ideologically significant consequence of thereby suggesting that
the expectation could be met in other circumstance when in fact it never
could be conclusively. The point is not that, in Peircean terms, the index-
ical cannot escape from the sign; it is indeed that the index can tell us
nothing of it. That it does not do so is a measure of the limitation of
Peirce’s unproblematized assertion of Arago’s vision despite the powerful,
and continuing, ideological ramifications as to the evidentiary strength of
the photographic image embedded in this tradition. Wollen’s use of Peir-
ce’s indexical vision of the photograph speaks to the continued power of
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photography’s claim on the real into the last quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury when such naivety was otherwise under a certain amount of intellec-
tual attack and was being, eventually, drastically undercut by the flexibil-
ity of digital imaging.
But Wollen was also responsible for a particular version of Peirce that
speaks to a second, more general level of signification practice in Un-
known White Male — the overall presentation of Bruce’s self (or selves).
Wollen’s concentration on the triadic imported a formalist and limited
Peirce into film and media studies at a cost to Peirce the pragmatist phi-
losopher, a man who exerted considerable influence through James and
Dewey on both psychology and experiential learning. Marred by a pro-
pensity to neologisms and obscurity of language, the originality of his
thought has been overshadowed. Peirce was lost and the essential func-
tion of the cinematic sign was deemed to be without question (largely on
Wollen’s misunderstood explication, never mind Peirce’s own convoluted
account) indexical. Yet Peirce the pragmatist has more to say about the
nature of the sign that is pertinent to the question of the representation
of the subject than this narrow reading of the triadic suggests. For him,
the implications of the ability to discern the three types of connectivity
within the sign are crucial to an understanding of selfhood. Peirce argued
that ‘all reasoning is an interpretation of signs’ and synthesising, in any
sign, icon, index and symbol is crucial. Obviously, much of the imagery
in Unknown White Male strenuously demands such integration, for the
reality of Bruce’s amnesia most assuredly does not press itself indexically
on the viewer.
Bruce’s subway car iconically resembles the car he actually used; he re-
sembles externally at least the subject he actually was on the night and
who he is actually now; his physicality and that of the carriage indexically
signify to one degree or another the photographic process as well as rep-
resenting the type — New York subway carriage, dropped-out yuppie
banker; and the distortion symbolizes his state of mind. We can read the
images exactly as an integrated sign; but we can also assume that Bruce,
as a subject, cannot integrate his sense of self in the same way because of
his (supposed?) personality disorder. For Peirce, failure of this sort is ex-
tremely significant for the subject. Not to see one element of the triad is a
mark of a lack of the power to synthesize, an indication of disruption to
the personality — a personality disorder.
Personality lies in the unity of the I think — which is the unity of symbolization —
the unity of consistency and belongs to every symbol. It is an existence, cut o¤
from the external world, for feeling and attention are essential elements of the
symbol. (CP 7.593)
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Any cursory examination, then, of Peirce reveals the importance of signs
to thought. He asserts: ‘All thinking is by signs’ (CP 5.534). This hints at
a notion of self-consciousness and self-control that is absent from static
accounts of his approach to semiotics, which only empathize the gulf be-
tween ‘sign’ and ‘object.’ Instead, Peirce links the notion of sign with a
universal capacity for experience, which is in turn linked with the natural
world and our embodied states. Peirce’s signs cannot be separated from
either experience or the user. When he writes of the indexicality of the ‘in-
stantaneous photograph,’ this is contextualized by a ‘person in a dreamy
state’ who is waking up and eventually synthesising experience, and be-
coming ‘aware of learning’ (EP 2: 4). Thought and personality cannot be
separated:
A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an interpretation, that is, by
virtue of its determining another sign of the same object. This is as true of mental
judgements as it is of external signs. (CP 5.569)
This hints at a continuity of personality that accompanies us in our
dreaming and wakeful states:
Does the mind cease to exist when it sleeps? And is it a new man who wakes every
morning? (CP 7.343). In all reasoning, we have to use a mixture of likenesses,
indices and symbols, we cannot dispense with any of them. The complex whole
may be called a symbol: for its symbolic, living character is the prevailing one.
(EP 2: 10)
Although Bruce might be forgetful of Murray (and others), he displays a
newfound empathy for the people around him. Murray thought that the
new Doug seemed ‘more articulate, more serious more focused.’ It would
seem that he is capable of forming new relationships, and is able to indi-
cate the changed state of his old friendships through words and actions;
but on the other he doesn’t know who lives at No. 10 Downing Street.
Things that are normally part of our (tacit) shared experience have to be
pointed out to him indexically. Bruce has become Borges’s Funes the
Memorious in reverse! However, much some of these inconsistencies
might raise doubts as to the authenticity of his condition, they can be ex-
plained in Peircean terms:
Two things here are all-important to assure oneself of and to remember. The first
is that a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is ‘saying
to himself,’ that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the
flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to per-
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suade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of lan-
guage. The second thing to remember is that the man’s circle of society, (however
widely or narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted
person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism.
(CP 5.421)
The two Bruces of the Unknown White Male are exactly not integrated
and the representations, pre- and post-amnesia, therefore reflect this. The
two representations are (supposedly?) of two significantly di¤erent sub-
jects for all that indexically their photographic image ‘forces’ them iconi-
cally to closely resemble each other on the screen. Unknown White Male
can therefore be said to raise questions as to the nature of the relationship
of the subject to its representation which go far beyond crude issues of the
authenticity of the image and the ethics of the filmmaking process.
And this matters not as the business of a somewhat arcane debate. Its
importance is because of its practical ramifications in bolstering, or not,
the cultural status of the photographic in the media; and, at the outset
of the twenty-first century, it is not farfetched to argue that the ability to
understand the relationship between sign and object has ramifications
(some deadly) well beyond the taxonomic. Peirce was right to suggest
that ‘reasoning’ resulted from the interpretation of signs. Unfortunately,
though, unreasoning would appear to be just as likely. It is often the driv-
ing force in arguments about the ‘o¤ensiveness’ of images, the inability to
assess the truth claims of representations and any meaningful assessment
of personal or social damage. Such irrationality clearly represents a fail-
ure to integrate the triad in the sign and is therefore a mark of a person-
ality disorder on occasion far less benign than Bruce’s personal situation;
but it is of a piece. Such confusion, it can be argued, always has baleful
consequences. Unknown White Male exists in such a Borgesian world of
confusion between the sign and the subject. It is not only Funes but the
whole world — On Exactitude in Science:
In that Empire, the art of cartography attained such perfection that the map of a
single province occupied the entirety of a city, and the map of the Empire, the en-
tirety of a province. In time, those unconscionable maps no longer satisfied, and
the Cartographers Guilds struck a map of the Empire whose size was that of the
Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following generations,
who were not so fond of the study of cartography as their forebears had been,
saw that that vast map was useless, and not without some pitilessness was it, that
they delivered it up to the inclemencies of sun and winters. In the deserts of the
West, still today, there are tattered ruins of that map, inhabited by animals and
beggars; in all the land there is no other relic of the disciplines of geography.
(Borges 1972: 131)
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The concept that, iconically, the object and the image are the same speaks
not only to the need for the subject to fuse the triadic when reasoning.
Failure so to do leads to an assumption that an icon can be a spur to
action in the world and then an o¤ensive image can be legitimately by
this connectivity made into the basis of action, up to and including killing
people in its name. Bruce’s amnesia, whether real or not, is of some
moment.
Notes
* The authors wish to thank Mike Mason.
1. Unknown White Male (2005) Dir. Rupert Murray; Prod. Beadie Finzi; Editor Rupert
Murray; Photography Orlando Stuart; Sound Rupert Murray. Running Time: 89 min-
utes. Spectre Broadcasting for (UK) Channel 4.
2. David Sigal, ‘A trip down memory lane,’ Washington Post, March 22, 2006.
3. Manohla Dargis, ‘Mysteries, if not sunshine, of another spotless mind,’ New York
Times, February 24, 2006.
4. Unknown White Male, originally a Channel 4 television film, has benefited from this
resurgence by winning a theatrical release via exposure at the Sundance film festival.
5. The joke is Scott Bukatman’s.
6. Metz cites Lef for May–June 1923, which was reprinted in Cahiers du cine`ma no. 144
(June 1963).
7. No full English version of this was available before 1980: Narrative Discourse: An Es-
say on Method (trans. Jane Lewin). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
8. Peirce elaborated a ‘decalogue’ of ten sign-types to explain the various ways that the
connectivity could be characterized. Eventually he determined no less than 59,049 of
these ‘sign types’ (CP 8.343).
9. A pure icon was a very rare occurrence in Peirce’s day most closely then being exempli-
fied by the photogram; but, perhaps, it can be suggested, less rare in the age of the ho-
logram and, specifically, the holographic interferometer. The holographic interferome-
ter is a device whereby a machined object ‘in the metal’ is placed ‘inside’ a holograph
of the same object (made perfectly) and any microscopic deviancies in the real object
show up as an interference pattern around its edges. The ‘real,’ as it were, is tested
against the virtual.
10. On the other hand, there is a shot — following the images of Bruce, distorted and un-
distorted shots of the carriage and the views from its windows — of an ‘F’ train —
which does go to where Bruce finished up that night. That train is seen pulling away
from the camera in contradistinction to the ‘B’ train that is coming towards it. These
two shots therefore conventionally reinforce the impression that we are watching Bru-
ce’s journey, and logically we are deemed to understand from the general context of the
film that this has to have been entirely reconstructed.
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